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We consider the new eu member states as semi-peripheral coun-
tries standing at the development crossroads. We emphasize the socio-
cultural factors of development, present a model for bringing together
several cultural and social influences, and test its validity by applying a
fuzzy-set methodology, a rather novel approach in social sciences. We
augment our analysis of internal socio-cultural factors by considering
the likely changes in the external framework conditions. Focusing on
demography, technology, and global economic and political structures,
we outline possible scenarios for European development that will cer-
tainly aﬀect the chances of individual countries. As our contribution,
we discuss the interplay between such framework conditions and inter-
nal development capabilities and draw some implication for the case of
Slovenia.
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Introduction: Standing at the Development Crossroads
Catching-up of transition countries with the old eu member states is
mostly considered in terms of economic development, both in the sense
of the target indicator (gdp per capita levels in terms of purchasing
power parity) and the key development drivers (physical and human
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capital investment, technological innovation, economic reforms).¹ It
is expected that real convergence, understood along the lines of Barro
(1991), will inevitably take place once the proper policies and economic
structures are in place. Dissenting views are rare. An interesting exam-
ple is that of Cheshire and Magrini (2000), who analyze the evolution
of regional per capita incomes on the basis of the empirical growth
model combined with the Markov chain method. Their results point
to an inherent trend of increasing divergence both within the group of
poorer regions in Europe and, especially, between the poorer and richer
regions.
In this paper, we take a broader perspective on transition countries’
development. In our view, the new eu member states are standing at
the development crossroads. They are considered as semi-peripheral
countries, whose competitiveness hinges on infrastructure investment
(in terms of material, institutional, and informational infrastructure),
upgrading of production programmes and leadership of enterprises
(Sofian 2001 as cited in Roncˇevic´ 2007, 221). We add to this perspec-
tive the importance of socio-cultural development factors. We present a
model bringing together several cultural and social influences and test
its validity by applying a fuzzy-set methodology, a rather novel approach
in social sciences.
Taking a broader perspective on convergence implies that one is nec-
essarily dealing with long run issues. This takes us from the world of
economic forecasting to the world of building long–run development
scenarios. We therefore augment our analysis of internal socio-cultural
factors by considering the likely changes in the external framework con-
ditions. Focusing on demography, technology, and global economic and
political structures, we outline possible scenarios for European develop-
ment that will certainly aﬀect the chances of individual countries. As our
contribution, we discuss the interplay between such framework condi-
tions and internal development capabilities.
When drawing the implications of our analysis, we focus on Slovenia
as an example of a country to which our framework applies. Slovenia is
generally considered as one of the success stories of transition. The coun-
try achieved one of the highest average growth rates among the eu ac-
cession candidates, and its economic growth was by far the least volatile
among transition countries. Moreover, this stable and reasonably high
growth rate was achieved without major macroeconomic imbalances.
Regarding social and political developments, Slovenia’s unemployment
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table 1 The oﬃcial vision for the change in Slovenia’s development model
Current Development Model Vision of the New Social Development
Model
Regulation and bureaucratisation of
markets
Deregulation and liberalisation of markets
Restrictive business environment Promoting enterprise creation and growth
Relatively closed financial markets Open and competitive financial markets
Insuﬃcient flexibility of the labour market A more flexible labour market
Collective social security system Individual needs and responsibility
Corporatism of large social partners Open, broad-based partner co-operation
Bureaucratic, hierarchical public sector Decentralisation, public private
partnership
Focus on macroeconomic and social
balances
Focus on sustainable development based
on structural reforms and a dynamic
society
notes Adapted from imad 2005.
and poverty rates were both below the eu average. Spending on social
benefits, as a percentage of gdp, was also comparable to the eu average,
indicating preservation of a rather generous welfare state. Comprehen-
sive social partnership institutions also helped preventing social unrest.²
Widespread optimism regarding Slovenia’s development has waned in
recent years. A number of economists took the opinion that incomplete
economic transition created significant structural ineﬃciencies with
negative impact on the country’s competitiveness. This was reflected
in the slowdown of economic convergence, as compared to several other
transition countries. Weakening economic competitiveness made it in-
creasingly diﬃcult to finance the welfare state and to provide workers
with wages above subsistence.³ Such a critical view has been taken up
in oﬃcial documents. For example, Slovenia’s Development Strategy
(imad 2005)⁴ has set out a thorough change in the country’s develop-
ment model, as presented in table 1. Our approach in this paper will
help us shed some light on the realism of such a target and the necessary
conditions for achieving it.
In the next section, we present a theoretical model of internal socio-
cultural development factors and test its validity by applying it to a set of
European countries. We continue by considering diﬀerent scenarios for
broad framework conditions and conclude by drawing up the implica-
tions and conclusion of our analysis.
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Internal Factors of Development
We understand internal development factors in terms of the capacities
of a country to deal with challenges imposed by changes in external
framework conditions. We focus on the less tangible socio-cultural fac-
tors of development, which were once ignored, but became popular after
the ‘cultural turn’ at the end of the 1980s. At that time, and under the
weight of empirical evidence, social scientists started to deal with the role
of non-economic factors of development. These studies focused mostly
on Japan and the four Asian tigers (South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan
and Singapore). We examine in what way these factors play their role
in achieving a development breakthrough and in what way we need to
consider them in shaping development policies.⁵
theoretical starting points
The idea of socio-cultural factors of development is far from being new.
Max Weber’s well known Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism
(2001) emphasised the role of non-economic factors in economic de-
velopment. The awareness of such a connection is also found among
classical and neo-classical economists, starting with Adam Smith, and
continuing with Alfred Marshall (Adam et al. 2005). We must also note
the important role of Talcott Parsons, who partially followed Webber in
shaping his ideas on cultural factors of social development.
Among contemporary economists, a prominent role is that of Michael
Porter who introduced the concept of competitive advantages of nations,
pointing out that achieving competitiveness is a highly complex and lo-
calised process depending on many direct and indirect factors, such as
economic structures, quality of governance, values, culture, and past de-
velopment. In sociology, the focus shifted from simple to reflexive mod-
ernisation and new forms of societal coordination related to this shift.
In the theories of Anthony Giddens, Ulrich Beck and Helmut Wilke a
particular role is attributed to knowledge and forms of development co-
ordination within extremely complexmodern societies. Such approaches
enable us to move beyond the old dilemmas of primacy of the free mar-
ket versus the state (Adam et al. 2005).
Several studies consider successful cases of countries that achieved
a development leap. They show that development processes can be
speeded up by a number of factors, but that most of them are connected
to a specific environment. We speak of contextual specific processes (Kim
and Nelson 2000; O’Hearn 1998; Battel 2003; Walsh 1999; O’Riain 2000;
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Castells and Himanen 2002). That is why it is very diﬃcult to predict the
long-term consequences (success) of specific policies.
What are these necessary conditions that enable countries or regions
to respond to developmental challenges? Berend points to the impor-
tance of trans-nationalisation, connected with privatisation and mar-
ketisation, in his analysis of the recent Irish success story and of the
Mediterranean ‘miracle’⁶ (Berend 2001). To focus on Ireland, we can say
that the massive inflow of fdi – fostered by easy access to the eu market⁷
and a well-educated and relatively cheap labour force –, the know-how
related to fdi, and the massive influx of money from eu Structural
Funds played an important role (O’Hearn 1998). But had this fdi inflow
not been accompanied with internal qualitative changes (increased edu-
cation, institutional eﬃciency, etc.), it would only have served to consol-
idate the relatively unfavourable position of Ireland in the international
division of labour. That would happen if the fdi were located primar-
ily in the extraction sectors or if their primary purpose were to expand
their own business and gain market shares in new, ‘virgin’ markets. The
beneficial spillover eﬀects are not possible without internal structural
changes. Hence, we can argue that internationalisation and a massive
influx of capital is a necessary condition. But it is not suﬃcient.⁸
In an earlier work on industrialisation and formation of the Euro-
pean periphery in the 19th century (Berend and Ranki 1982), Berend and
his coauthor oﬀered a much more refined, systematic and holistic anal-
ysis of development factors. They outlined socio-political prerequisites
of change, human factors, the role of the state, the integration into the
world market, foreign trade and export branches. These factors may be
grouped as internal (the first three) and external (the last two).While it is
clear that without external factors a country cannot succed in joining the
group of aﬄuent, developed countries (unless it undertakes a long and
uncertain process of own capital accumulation), their analysis makes a
strong point that internal factors are crucial determinants of a country’s
position in the international system.
Van Rossem also showed that development is not exclusively a conse-
quence of the international environment, i. e. the positioning of a coun-
try towards others. Although the international environment imposes
constraints on countries, especially on the economically backward ones,
it does not solely determine the dependency and developmental perfor-
mance of a country. His conclusion is that ‘internal social, economic, and
political structures and actors become vital factors in development, and
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can modify the eﬀects of the international environment’ (van Rossem
1996, 524). To put it simply, the basic preconditions for developmental
performance are endogenous, but we should take the input from the en-
vironment into account. This is also the starting point of the model of
socio-cultural factors presented in the next section.⁹
Despite lagging behind, Eastern European countries developed spe-
cific forms of modernisation. Its impulses were rarely endogenous. If it
happened, modernisation was deformed or partial. Industrialisation was
not promoted by a new capitalist social class, the bourgeoisie, but rather
by the aristocracy as an attempt to preserve its privileged position. Con-
sequently, processes of functional diﬀerentiation, with a specialised eco-
nomic subsystem as a result, did not take place. Production processes
were therefore less eﬃcient and did not operate with the same logic as
in the earliest industrialised countries.¹⁰ Partial forms of modernisation
continued in the second half of the 20th century, which led to specific
forms of modernisation, which only met some conditions of modernity.
This is why some authors labelled them as ‘by-modernity’ (Bernik 1989)
or ‘deformed modernity’ (Adam 1989).
a heuristic model of socio-cultural factors
of development
The importance of ‘intangible’ factors has been recognised for some time
now.¹¹ They were mainly dealt with in a relatively intuitive way¹² or at
a purely theoretical level (Swidler 1986). Some authors attempted at so-
phisticated calculations of relations between cultural and economic vari-
ables, but their conclusions were marked as preliminary (Granato Ingle-
hart and Leblang 1996; Swank 1996). An integrated conceptual frame-
work for comparative evaluation of specific development factors is still
lacking.
In our own research, we have developed a robust and holistic model
incorpotating the socio-cultural factors into analysis of developmental
performance (see Adam et al. 2005; Adam and Roncˇevic´ 2004). The
model has applied aspects as well, as it can point to specific factors that
hinder development, thereby enabling the formulation of targeted poli-
cies for sustained development.
The model has three levels. The third level is developmental perfor-
mance, which is a resultant of interaction between diﬀerent factors and
their mutual influence; in other words, it is a result of developmen-
tal processes. Definition and operationalisation of this level depends to
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some extent on specific research interests or on social, political or strate-
gic goals. As an example of politically defined strategic goals, we can
imagine a semiperipheral East-Central Europe country setting itself the
goal of achieving a developmental breakthrough and joining the group
of core European countries.
Developmental performance depends on a group of factors, which
constitute the first and the second level of our model. The first level is
built on sedimentation of past developmental trajectories and experi-
ences (history matters). We term this factor as civilisational competence.¹³
It is a ‘latent structure of cognitive, normative, expressive and motiva-
tional elements which enable individuals and social communities to ori-
ent themselves in the diﬀerent subsystems of modern (or modernising)
societies’ (Adam et al. 2005, 24). The concept of civilisational compe-
tence is based on two civilising principles, self-control (self-imposed dis-
cipline) and self-initiative (active participation) (Elias 1994).
The second and central part of the model consists of current and
prospective factors of development. They are divided into internal and
external ones. The former include cognitive mobilisation, entrepreneurial
spirit, quality of governance, social cohesion and social capital. The latter
include openness (internationalisation), implying both rational utilisa-
tion of foreign resources (such as foreign direct investments or structural
funds) and active adaptation to the environment, which by definition is
more complex than the system (society) itself (Heylighen 1992).
Internal current and prospective factors of development are in the
focus of our research, as these are ‘the most easily’ influenced by spe-
cific policies. The concept of cognitive competences was developed to take
into account the strategic role of knowledge for systemic competitive-
ness, as emphasized by the literature on human resources and human
capital. The importance of entrepreneurial spirit in development is also
well-recognised. Some aspects of this subject have already been studied
by Max Weber. We developed our concept to take into account relevant
conditions for the creation of new opportunities or even to anticipate
these opportunities and react to changes in the business environment.
Moreover, one has to take into account the regulatory framework,
as institutions aﬀect enterprise performance (de Soto 2000). Quality of
governance is hence an important factor of development. It can be ex-
pressed in a variety of ways, e. g. as protection of property rights, the
administrative burden, the coordinative role of the state, support for
consensus-building and its implementation through democratic proce-
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figure 1 The heuristic model of socio-cultural factors of developmental
performance (adapted from Adam et al. 2005)
dures, contextual intervention, regulation. Social cohesion, as another
important factor of development (Ritzen and Woolcock 2000), does not
imply a monolithic and undiﬀerentiated society. Instead, it implies sol-
idarity, meaningful identities and participation. It enables mobilisation
and utilisation of broader potentials and contributes to consensus build-
ing, which is diﬃcult in a society with a high level of social exclusion, ex-
treme inequalities and anomie. Highly cohesive societies are more prone
to sustained development.
The role of current and prospective factors of development depends
on the organisation and utilisation of synergetic potentials. This is why
social capital holds the central position within the model. We have to
be careful when applying this concept (see Adam and Roncˇevic´ 2003),
but it can be eﬀectively used in analysis of coordination and consensus
building, reduction in transaction costs etc. It enables synergies of other
current and prospective factors.
verifying the model: a fuzzy-set analysis
We shall attempt to verify the model by applying the fuzzy-set method-
ology for social sciences as developed by Charles Ragin (2000). This
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method is widely applied in hard sciences when dealing with problems of
engineering in face of ambiguity and complexity. One can hardly dispute
that the problems we are dealing with in many social sciences are any-
thing but ambiguous and complex, including the analysis of the factors
of development of societies. The application of this analytical approach
would seem appropriate from this perspective.
Furthermore, it is important that fuzzy-set methodology provides the
researcher with ‘interpretative algebra,’ an approach that takes both con-
ceptual and mathematical-analytical aspects into account, thus enabling
social scientists to employ a dialogue between ideas and empirical evi-
dence, the much-desired systematic interplay between theory and data.
According to Ragin (2000, 5–6), it is possible to become involved in a
much richer dialogue with fuzzy-set analysis than with ‘conventional’
analytical procedures for three reasons. Firstly, with fuzzy sets one can
avoid problems with the usual homogenising assumptions in the analy-
sis of large populations, and this allows for an analysis of smaller pop-
ulations, such as ours (27 countries). Secondly, fuzzy sets can be used
to enhance diversity-oriented research. This is potentially important in
the context of our analysis, due to the fact that ‘each latecomer has its
own story’ on the specific form of its development. Were there a dif-
ferent combination of necessary conditions, it would be important for
our analysis to point to them. Finally, fuzzy sets can be carefully tai-
lored to fit theoretical concepts. This is again an important aspect of our
analysis.
To start the analysis we must first specify the relevant domains. These
would have to be theoretically justified in certain cases, but in our analy-
sis domains are determined by our research interest and the focus of our
analysis. We have 27 relevant domains, namely the eu member states (ex-
cluding Luxembourg, Cyprus and Malta), two efta countries (Switzer-
land and Norway) and Russia.
In Adam et al. (2005), fuzzy sets have been precisely defined as diﬀer-
ent socio-cultural factors and developmental performance. Each country
was assigned membership in each set. This membership is anywhere be-
tween 1 (indicating full membership in a set of e. g. developed countries)
and 0 (indicating non-membership in the set). One can also decide on a
certain number of anchors and thus limit available membership scores.
We have decided to opt for three anchors. In addition to full member-
ship and non-membership we also assigned partial membership (value
0.5). We used the following sets of data to assign membership scores to
individual countries:
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• civilisational competence was measured on the basis of the level of
modernisation (this refers to political, economic and social changes
occurring since the 19th century) and the geo-political position,
with highly modernised countries named as core countries and the
rest determined regarding their geo-political position and borders;
• entrepreneurial spirit was evaluated on the basis of the Total en-
trepreneur activity index, Cluster innovation environment index,
Business r&d intensity, and Index of economic freedom;
• quality of governance was evaluated regarding Political rights and
civil liberties ratings, the Voice and accountability index, Political
stability index, Government stability index, Rule of law index, and
the Corruption perception index;
• social cohesion was evaluated on the basis of Share of income and
consumption, Solidarity index, and Number of suicides per 100.000
people;
• evaluation of the level of social capital was undertaken by compar-
ing Generalized trust, Active involvement in voluntary associations
and Spending time in clubs and associations;
• internationalisation was scored by taking into account Inward for-
eign direct investments in gdp and External trade ratios to gdp.¹⁴
On the basis of this procedure, we were able to assemble the data for
fuzzy–set analysis in a spreadsheet presented in table 2.
results of the fuzzy-set analysis¹⁵
After having formed the fuzzy set spreadsheet, we can attempt an empir-
ical verification of the model of socio-cultural factors of developmental
performance. We can test relationships between the three levels of the
model. First is the impact of the level ‘history matters’ on the level of cur-
rent and prospective factors. If our model is correct, the analysis would
have to show that civilisational competence is a necessary cause of other
factors.
According to the results of regression analysis, as presented in table
3, civilisational competence is usually the necessary cause of other fac-
tors of developmental performance, with the exception of the quality of
governance. Looking at the data in table 2, we can see why this is the
case. Across a range of countries, membership in the fuzzy–set ‘qual-
ity of governance’ exceeds their membership in the set of ‘civilisational
competence.’ This is a consequence of democratisation in a number of
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table 2 Fuzzy–set spreadsheet
Country dp cc sc cm qg es coh op
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Denmark 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Finland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Norway 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sweden 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Austria 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 1
Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 1
Switzerland 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 1
uk 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 1
Ireland 1 0.5 1 1 1 1 0.5 1
France 1 1 0.5 1 1 1 0.5 0.5
Italy 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.5
Spain 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5
Portugal 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5
Czech R. 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Slovenia 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Estonia 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.5
Hungary 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.5
Greece 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0.5
Slovakia 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 1 0.5
Poland 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.5
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Russia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
notes Abbreviations: dp – developmental performance, cc – civilisational compe-
tence, sc – social capital, cm – cognitive mobilisation, qg – quality of governance, es –
entrepreneurial spirit, coh – social cohesion, op – openness. Adapted from Adam et al.
2005, 208.
countries with lower levels of civilisational competence that took sway in
the past few decades. Interesting examples are Spain and Portugal, which
have improved their quality of governance significantly since the 1970s,
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table 3 Relationship between civilisational competence and other development
factors
Dependent factor p-value
sc 0.017*
cm 0.033*
qg 0.358
es 0.012*
coh 0.003*
op 0.025*
notes *Denotes significance at 10 per cent level.
table 4 Relationship between socio-cultural factors and developmental performance
Cause variable Observed outcome** Binominal prop. p-value
cc 19 0.90 0.009*
sc 17 0.81 0.092*
cm 19 0.90 0.009*
qg 20 0.95 0.001*
es 20 0.95 0.001*
coh 12 0.57 Not significant
op 19 0.90 0.009*
notes *Denotes significance at 10 per cent level. ** The size of our sample is 27 coun-
tries, but only 21 were included in the analysis. This is due to the specifics of the fuzzy-set
analysis of suﬃcient conditions. Namely, including cases where the outcome is 0 would
positively bias the results towards verification of the researcher’s hypothesis. Those cases
where the cause (individual factors of development) has a higher or equal fuzzy-set
membership than the outcome (developmental performance) confirm that a specific
factor is a suﬃcient cause. Hence, the column ‘Observed outcome’ shows the number
of cases where this is the case. The logic is: the higher the ‘observed outcome,’ the higher
the ‘binominal proportion.’ The final row shows the calculated statistical significance.
especially as a consequence of the accession to the eu. Special cases are
the post-socialist countries, where significant improvements also took
place as part of democratisation in the 1990s, although of the quality of
governance is still not the highest quality.
The second is the relationship between the two levels of socio-cultural
factors and developmental performance. The model is considered as em-
pirically verified if the factors are statistically significant necessary con-
ditions for developmental performance:
The results show that civilisational competence, social capital, cog-
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nitive mobilisation, quality of governance, entrepreneurial spirit and
openness of societies are necessary conditions for developmental perfor-
mance. The only factor that is not statistically significant is the level of
social cohesion. However, we can note that no country with high levels of
developmental performance has a low level of social cohesion, and only
two countries with medium developmental performance (Hungary and
Estonia) have low levels of social cohesion. Moreover, all countries with
a low level of developmental performance have low social cohesion. We
have therefore conducted another analysis, where we tested a diﬀerent
relation, namely, the relation between a poor level of social cohesion as
a necessary cause of poor developmental performance. In this case the
relationship was statistically significant: a low social cohesion is usually
a necessary cause for a low developmental performance. But it is not a
suﬃcient one, meaning that some other negative conditions have to be
fulfilled as well.
The analysis also showed that a combination of all necessary factors
is a statistically significant suﬃcient condition of developmental perfor-
mance. This result has important implications: a country can embark on
a positive development path only if all factors are present simultaneously.
There has to be a cumulative eﬀect and synergy among factors.
framework conditions for future development
Having demonstrated the importance of internal socio-cultural factors
of development, we now turn to considering framework conditions that
will constrain or enhance the opportunities for countries to realize their
develoment potential. The most important, but certainly not exclusive,
framework conditions are – in our view – economic structure of the
world, political structure of the eu, demographic trends and technolog-
ical developments. We do not separetely consider factors such as climate
change or availability of energy, as they will impact on each of the four
areas that we address.
economic structure of the world
Globalisation, of course, is the main feature of economic developments
in the 21st Century. The important point here is that globalisation has
now enabled fast development not only of the traditional ‘tigers,’ which
were as a rule rather small countries, but also of some ‘giants,’ whose
economic size, by current rates of growth, may in a decade or so equal
the economic size of the eu.
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Such developments may create serious tensions on at least three ac-
counts:
• New global geography of economic activity, where new centres of eco-
nomic power, but also human, financial and information capital,
would reach critical mass so as to challenge the competitive capac-
ity of the ‘western’ world. This is an overly pessimistic perspective,
as growth of the emerging economies also promotes growth in the
now developed world. The latter, however, is increasingly forced
into structural reforms, which enable opportunities to dominate
over threats. If, however, modern western world economies would
be unwilling or unable to adapt its working and living practices
to the new global circumstances, then the new economies could
become a serious challenge for the preservation of the present stan-
dard of living in the western world.
• Unprecedented increase in demand for raw materials and energy, and
the corresponding increase in pressures on the natural environment.
The new ‘giants’ (China, India) would, at the time when the size of
their gdp equals that of the eu, create equally strong demand on
the world markets as the eu does. However, as their gdp per capita
would still be much lower than that of the eu, the structure of their
demand will be relatively more directed towards energy, raw mate-
rials and industrial inputs. At this time, there is no clear solution for
these problems. If a solution is not found, we may increasingly face
rising raw-material prices, energy shortages, climate change eﬀects
etc.
• Pressures for a diﬀerent political division of the world. The new gi-
ants will demand an equal role in the processes and institutions
that govern global economic order. Given their lesser economic de-
velopment (in terms of gdp per capita), and consequently a more
energy and environment intensive pattern of growth, this change in
balance may also imply a change in priorities on the international
agenda. The stronger the shortage of the raw-materials and energy
will become, the more likely it is that this process of political ‘rebal-
ancing’ may involve serious conflicts, including military ones.
There are, in principle, three possible outcomes (scenarios):
• Emergence of a new leading world power. It may be said that in the
past there was usually one super-power dominating the rest of the
world in both economic and political terms. After the industrial rev-
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olution, this had been the uk, and since the World War ii, it is the
usa. One possible outcome of current tensions is that there will
emerge a new economic and political super-power. However, there
seems to be no clear and easily acceptable candidate for such a lead-
ing role.Moreover, if the global political game becomes one of fight-
ing for a dominant position, it is very likely that its outcome will be
determined only through military conflict of a global dimension;
• Emergence of a multi-polar world. Rather than one super-power be-
ing replaced by a new one, it is possible that a balance will emerge
between several economic and political blocks. One of them could
still be the usa (with nafta?), another a much more federatively
organized eu, the third one China, the fourth one East-Asia (Japan
with the ‘old’ Asian tigers), etc. The global political game would
then be one of balancing or finding a stable equilibrium between
these diﬀerent poles. Such a game is more likely to be solved in a
non-violent way;
• Emergence of a highly decentralized world, with many centres of de-
velopment, resembling a world of city-states and prosperous re-
gions. Especially if a stable equilibrium between a limited number
of ‘poles’ proves hard to establish, the process of global decentrali-
sation may continue, leading to multiple small centres of economic
development, with international political institutions and powers
becoming less important.
The European Commission seems to believe in the second of the three
scenarios. In its communication to Heads of States and governments
(Commission of the European Communities 2007), it stresses the im-
portance of ‘Europe’ speaking with one voice in the world. This com-
munication, which is formally the Commission’s interim report on the
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs, is almost entirely devoted to the
challenges of globalisation and to the so-called ‘external dimension’ of
the strategy. It builds its argument on the notion of the European in-
terest, which has to be ‘specifically defined, strongly articulated, stoutly
defended, and vigorously promoted,’ and claims the eu to be ‘the best
tool to enable Europeans to shape globalisation.’
In our view, the first of the three possible outcomes (a new super-
power) is the least likely, especially as development and technological
diﬀerences in the world are diminishing. In the medium term, therefore,
the scenario of a multi-polar world (with three or four poles) seems to
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be the most natural outcome of current developments. However, it also
seems at least possible, if not probable, that in the long-run (some 50
years) the multi-polar world would decentralise further in direction of
the third scenario.
political structure of the eu
The big issue here is whether Europe will, in time, develop into a feder-
ation in the sense of a ‘United States of Europe,’ or will perhaps devolve
into a more decentralised organisation. One obvious line of argument
says that Europe must becomemore capable of acting as one entity in the
world, and that to achieve this, it must also become capable of more ef-
ficient decision making internally (ec 2007). On the political level, there
seems to be a lot of at least declarative support for a more federative Eu-
rope.
This argument seems so obvious to many precisely because the cur-
rent decision-making procedures in the eu are complicated and often
even very simple decision (such as establishing an eu-wide patent of-
fice) take several years. There seem to be two reasons for this. One is
that, even in the areas where decisions are taken at the eu level, this
decision-making still often involves complicated negotiations between
representatives of government, plagued with perverse systematic incen-
tives and often dealing with details that would normally be left to the
executive discretion. The other is that, also in the areas where there is no
genuine eu sovereignty, complicated processes of the ‘open-method of
coordination’ have been introduced, de facto hampering the autonomy
of member states and increasing the cost of decision-making.
While it is clear that the decision-making eﬃciency has to be greatly
improved in the eu, there are at least two ways to do so:
• The United States of Europe. Sovereignty over an increasing num-
ber of policy areas would be transferred to the eu level. Decision
making at the eu level would be simplified and would increasingly
resemble that of a common representative democracy. Legislative
decisions would be taken by the European parliament alone on a
simple majority vote, probably subject to a veto by a senate, repre-
senting nation states or regions. The Commission would be substi-
tuted by an executive body with much broader competences. The
scope for intergovernmental negotiations would be reduced to the
most basic political decisions, perhaps only to agreeing on changes
in the European constitution.
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• A decentralised federation. The decision procedures at the eu level
would be simplified similarly as in the previous scenario. However,
much fewer issues would be transferred into the sovereign respon-
sibility of the eu. On the other hand, for those issues over which
member states would retain sovereignty, the formal coordination
procedures would be radically streamlined, if not abandoned.
It is important to understand that the choice of the eu political struc-
ture is not entirely voluntary. We do not believe such a decision can be
taken in top-down manner, implying that the politicians should first de-
cide on the political structure of the eu, and then all other policies sce-
narios could be worked out accordingly. We believe that the decision on
the structure of the eu will depend on external factors (the shape of glob-
alisation, security and energy issues, strengths and policies of emerging
‘giants’ and the currently dominant us, etc.) and also on some internal
political factors.
The current state of aﬀairs in Europe does not enable us to expect any
significant political changes in the short run. The reformed eu treaty,
which was put in the place of the failed constitution, makes some steps
towards the federative direction, but they are rather modest and actually
pre-empt a more thorough discussion. The eu budget is also set until
2013, and for now it seems rather unlikely for the next financial perspec-
tive (up to 2018 or 2020) that any significant structural changes could
emerge. Indeed some proposals are being put forward that could notice-
ably improve the present state of play, thus also improving the decision-
making eﬃciency of the eu as a whole (see Wostner 2007), nevertheless
more profound changes could only be expected after 2020.
Despite these obstacles, most current discussions point towards the
direction of the United States of Europe scenario. In our view, such a
scenario is only possible in the long run with increased mobility inside
the Union and with radically changed citizen’s perception of the Union
as one home entity. With time, also the pressures of the global economic
competition and insecurity may become strong enough that the politi-
cal opposition to a federative Europe would lose ground. On the other
hand, it may also happen that in 2020 Europe would decide to move
towards the direction of a ‘the decentralised federation.’ It may prove a
good working compromise between demands for a more eﬀective feder-
ation and the opposition to transferring more and more competencies
to the ‘federal level.’
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demographic trends
The European demographic problem is well known. Demographic pro-
jections for the eu member states are provided by the Eurostat every few
years. Detailed projections of the impact of the ageing populations on the
public budgets are available for all member states in regular reports (ec
2009b). However, the possible social implications of ageing populations
are less researched.
It is important to understand that the projections were prepared not
with the intention of predicting the future as accurately as possible, but
with the aim of highlighting the dimension and structure of the ‘ageing
problem.’ Accordingly, projections are prepared on the assumption of no
policy change and on current trends in employment and productivity.
No rapid change in technology is envisaged, as projections work on the
assumption of a decreasing contribution of total factor productivity to
growth. Such an approach is very logical in the framework of a ‘warning
signal’ analysis, but in order to incorporate them into overall develop-
ment scenarios, some assumptions on the likely policy change should be
included.
technological development
From Malthus to the Club of Rome, economic science has predicted
many dismal scenarios, but none has yet materialised. The main rea-
son why the dismal predictions were avoided lies in the technological
progress, which always succeeded in creating new opportunities and so-
lutions at the right time to avoid a catastrophe. Indeed, in the long run,
technological progress seems to be the main determinant of our well-
being, both in the sense of what we can achieve and in the sense of how
productive we are.
Technological progress may determine the solutions we will be able
to adopt with respect to the previous issues. The increasing energy and
environmental scarcity can hardly be addressed without a serious tech-
nological breakthrough. The same goes for ageing – new technologies
may facilitate older people to at least partially remain in paid activ-
ity after reaching the pension age. Notwistanding some technological
foresight studies and studies on the likely social consequences of tech-
nological change, technological scenarios are inherently hard to build.
Technology is based on innovation, and innovation, if it is really an un-
precedented novelty, is by definition hard to predict or even to imagine
in advance.
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bringing the elements together
While it is hard enough to develop plausible scenarios for individual de-
velopment areas, the real challenge is to bring them together in a com-
pelling and comprehensive development vision. Here we present three
attempts that we consider as important steps towards this goal.
In 1999, the Forward Studies Unit of the European Commission out-
lined five possible scenarios for Europe in the year 2010 (Bertrand,
Michalski and Pench 1999):
• Triumphant markets: increasing globalisation and prevalence of
the ‘American economic model’ (deregulation, lower taxes, en-
trepreneurship, downsizing of the public sector); weakening of
eu common policies, integration focused on the Single Market;
stronger role of regions due to a more decentralized economy;
• The hundred flowers: increasing economic globalisation with seri-
ous risks for political stability, crime, environment; weakening of
eu common policies and withdrawal of some member states; devo-
lution of large organizations and nation states, development of city
states; public functions performed by local governments, associa-
tions and private organisations;
• Shared responsibilities: increasing globalisation with greater inter-
national policy coordination, led by the eu; increasing the role of
eu policy coordination in education, r&d, security and justice, in-
creasing the budget; stakeholder model of enterprise and competi-
tive corporatism; modernisation of the public sector governance;
• Creative societies: slowdown in globalisation due to public discon-
tent; strong development of common eu policies in the areas of
social protection, environment, economic stabilisation; cooperative
enterprises, importance of the non-profit sector;
• Turbulent neighbourhoods: slowdown in globalisation, developing of
closed regional blocks; security concern dominating eu common
policies and public opinion, rise of intolerance, increased role of
the state and authoritarianism.
Braunerhjelm et al. (2000) developed three scenarios, dealing with the
economic perspective of individual regions within the eu:
• Scenario of a balanced distribution of economic activity, based on
substantially increased specialization of particular regions, with
each of the regions finding its own market niche;
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• A strong concentration of economic activity, enabled by increased
labour mobility, resulting in depopulation of some areas, but with-
out strong unemployment problems;
• A permanent polarization, dividing Europe into eﬃcient, high in-
come, low unemployment regions on one side, and lagging-behind
regions with low income and high unemployment on the other.
This scenario is likely if the increased global competition is not met
by structural reforms of the eu economies.
The most extensive work in terms of future scenarios for Europe and
their regions was, to our knowledge, performed in the framework of the
espon network (www.espon.eu), where numbers of studies, usually with
the perspective until the year 2030, have been performed. They are fo-
cused on particular themes (e. g. polycentricism, enlargement, transport,
information society, natural hazards) as well as on impacts of particu-
lar policies (e. g. transport, r&d, cap, energy, cohesion policy). Partic-
ularly relevant is espon project 3.2. ‘Spatial Scenarios and Orientations
in relation to the esdp and Cohesion Policy’, which includes a quanti-
tive macroeconomic, sectoral, social and territorial model. Apart from
the baseline scenario, which takes account of what we called framework
conditions, they also develop a ‘cohesion-oriented prospective scenario’
and a ‘competitiveness-oriented prospective scenario.’ Depending on the
policy choices by the eu and the Member States, they find significant
diﬀerences in terms of concentration of economic activity in the Euro-
pean core, major cities, peripheral and rural areas and consequently their
welfare levels. On this basis they propose the ‘proactive scenario,’ which
aspires to put forward the right balance of policies based broadly on the
Scandinavian development model.
Discussion and Conclusion: Some Tentative Implications
for Slovenia’s Alternative Scenarios
We began our paper by asserting that, in order to meaningfully dis-
cuss the possibilities of development catch-up, one must consider both
the external framework conditions and the internal development capa-
bilities. Success in dealing with the four big challenges stemming from
changes in global economic structure, European political structure, de-
mographic trends and technological development, is always a resultant
of external forces that shape the conditions and internal processes and
adaptations.
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One way to analyze the interplay between framework conditions and
internal capabilities is to ask whether a given framework scenario would
increase the autonomy of regions and individual countries, or diminish
it? In case of increased autonomy, we should focus on country-specific
development assets (strengths and weaknesses). In case of decreasing au-
tonomy, we should however expect that individual countries will broadly
share the fortunes of the eu as a whole, although they may have some
means to improve their relative position even in such a context. Among
the scenarios outlined in the third section, we see as ‘autonomy enhanc-
ing’ the economic scenario of a more decentralised world and the po-
litical scenario of a more decentralised European Union. Technological
progress facilitating transfer of information, decentralised organisation
and ‘distance work,’ would also facilitate autonomy.
When asking about future trends of a country like Slovenia, one needs
to consider whether it is realistic to expect that any of the post-socialist
countries could in the foreseeable future be able to achieve developmen-
tal breakthrough and so to join the exclusive club of the rich countries of
the European core? This would in fact be a remarkable achievement, hav-
ing in mind the historically poor economic development performance.
In contrast to approaches based on extrapolation of current trends, we
embarked on searching for the answer to this question rather diﬀerently.
We were interested to see whether these states have developed the neces-
sary conditions for faster development.
Based on our analysis, we conlude that only some of the semi-periphe-
ral countries have a realistic possibility to become members of the group
of most developed European societies. We limit our optimism to those
which were classified as countries with a medium level of developmental
performance (Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia).
That means that their economies are already at the investment-driven
stage of development and are capable of building capacities to improve
the imported and assimilated technology and production methods, and
to manage the complex transition to innovation-driven development.
The obvious question is: can what specific societies do to enhance
their developmental performance? Implications of our results for shap-
ing holistic strategies of sustainable economic development confirm
some previous findings (Messner 1997; Mayntz 1987), that developmen-
tal policy makers must consider a series of structural limitations arising
from their own environment. Therefore, it is not realistic to expect that
simple direct interventions like increase in financial investment into spe-
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cific resource or infrastructure will considerably aﬀect developmental
performance. Hierarchic or ‘top-down’ approaches cannot give satisfac-
tory results. The post-socialist societies of Central and Eastern Europe
need to work their way towards establishing the right preconditions for
developmental performance. Successful strategies need to use sophisti-
cated mechanisms of contextual interventions to establish the conditions
where diﬀerent intangible factors of development develop simultane-
ously.
Obviously, no clear-cut prescriptions or recipes are possible, such as
those persistently advocated by numerous international institutions and
scientists in the course of the past decade. If there is something that one
can learn from past examples of successful transitions from the semi-
periphery to the core, it is that no country did so by imitating some
other country or by following such prescriptions. It needs to be clear that
social scientists are not able to generate solutions in the form of ‘pure’
prescriptions and ‘categorical imperatives’; they can at best produce hy-
pothetical solutions in the form of scenarios, multiple options and cost-
benefit or swot analyses. They can be very helpful by indicating and
evaluating the side eﬀects and potential risks of certain decisions and
policies. And, perhaps most importantly, they can attempt to trace the
necessary conditions for favourable outcomes. In the paper, we tried to
establish these ‘intangibles’ by using a heuristic model of socio-cultural
factors of developmental performance and with application of ‘fuzzy-set’
analysis.
Focusing on Slovenia, it scored as middle ground in all dimensions
of our fuzzy-set analysis. The implication is that, in order to achieve the
developmental breakthrough, the country must work simultaneously on
improving all internal factors of development. For ‘active societies’ (Et-
zioni 1968) such insights can be a useful tool for self-reflection, learn-
ing and adaptation of developmental policies. But, as argued elsewhere
(Roncˇevic´ 2008), Slovenia today cannot be considered as an ‘active so-
ciety.’ One can therefore question the current ability to learn from such
findings.
Hence, it would make sense to predict two broad and quite distinct
scenarios for the future. Themain diﬀerence between these two scenarios
should be the (in)ability to make a strategic shift in several very impor-
tant fields at the same time. The new development model should com-
bine positive characteristics of the more liberal economy with a Euro-
pean model of a partner-state, the latter nicely fitting Slovenia in terms
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of its development capabilities and values. On the other hand, inability
to break with the existing model would continue Slovenia’s path depen-
dency and semi-peripheral position.
As a small country, Slovenia should be naturally inclined to oppose
tendencies of political centralisation in the eu and of establishing a new
single global economic super-power. The rationale for this is that Slove-
nia would have a comparatively small influence on centralised decision-
making in the eu and that it would be higly risky to depend on only
one major economic partner. We should therefore consider autonomy-
enhancing framework scenarios as more beneficial. However, there are
areas where working together with – or simply leaning on – the eu insti-
tutions may help the country to develop its own internal capabilities. The
dimensions of governance and openness, but also of cognitive mobilisa-
tion and entreprenurial spirit, are those where adopting best practices
from other member states, or relying on common policies and the pres-
sures of the common market, may prove highly stimulative for internal
development processes.
Notes
1 A good example of a detailed analysis along such lines is the European
Commission study on ‘five years of enlargement’ (ec 2009a).
2 For a thorough review of Slovenia’s transition, see Mrak, Rojec and Silva-
Jauregui (2004).
3 See Šušteršicˇ (2009) for an overview of the arguments involved.
4 This strategic document sets out the vision and objectives of Slovenia’s
development until 2013 and includes five developmental priorities with
corresponding action plans. In order for Slovenia to achieve these goals it
needs to prepare and deliver sweeping structural reforms and change its
existing development pattern.
5 It needs to be emphasised that our focus on ‘intangibles’ does not ren-
der unimportant more ‘tangible’ factors like macroeconomic stability. But
we argue that it is not a factor which could explain the diﬀerences be-
tween highly developed and less developed countries. Stabilisation of the
macroeconomic framework is only a part of systemic competitiveness
genesis (Esser et al. 1996).
6 In Berend’s opinion, the Mediterranean eu member states are a success
story when compared to post-socialist countries. By employing long-term
data on gdp, he describes a ‘dramatic departure from their previously
similar growth patterns’ (Berend 2001, 258). But on the basis of data in-
dicating the position in the international division of labour and gdp, we
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would hesitate to talk about a success story. The substantial increase in
diﬀerences between Mediterranean countries and post-socialist countries
was primarily caused by a rupture of growth rates of the latter and is not
evidence of the developmental performance of the former.
7 Most fdi came from the usa (O’Hearn 1998).
8 Experts put forward diﬀerent views on the causes of Ireland’s sudden eco-
nomic growth. Some conclude that it was a consequence of a series of
reasons, being present far before anything happened (Walsh 1999; Battel
2003). Elsewhere a thesis was put forward that systemic discourse, institu-
tionalised in a long-term social partnership with strong spill-over eﬀects,
was the catalyser of existing development factors (Roncˇevic´ 2008).
9 The case of Czechoslovakia is telling. Between the world wars, it was the
only industrialised and developed Central European country. This was at
least to some extent the consequence of successful national confrontation
with the German speaking population. ‘After the 1840s, the Czech lands
were caught up in rivalry for economic dominance where on both sides
(German and Czech) the frenzy for education, culture, journals, clubs and
entrepreneurship became paramount’ (Benacˇek 2001, 137). The Czechs
were able to respond to the challenges of the industrial revolution. This
was not an enforced process; it was spontaneous and highly motivated.
Data on the density of industrial sites show that the country was the most
industrialised part of the monarchy. In 1914, Austria had 60 factories per
100,000 population. Czech lands had 94, while the central part of today’s
Slovenia had only 29 (Hocˇevar 1965, 45).
10 In Schöpflin’s (2000, 60) words: ‘In Central and South-Eastern Europe,
domestic models of modernity [. . .] were weak and not based very directly
on local socio-economic patterns, but were imported from outside, often
as a response to the intrusion of a power that was perceived as alien, and
as a defence against that intrusion. This process of importation inevitably
distorted the nature of modernity as it had evolved in the West, because
the domestic context was diﬀerent and the aspects of modernity that were
taken over were inevitably partial. Technology has a cultural context, and
the reception of technology without its enveloping culture changes its im-
pact. Hence the repeated attempts to make ‘a forced march through his-
tory’ and to catch up with Europe never achieved their objective.
11 In the 1940s and 1950s, there had been much interest in studying the role
of culture as a key element for understanding societies and analysing their
economic and political development (e. g. by Margaret Mead, Ruth Ben-
dict, Davis McClelland, Edward Banfield, Alex Inkeles, Lucien Pye). In the
60s, the interest dropped rapidly.
12 A good example is the yearbook Culture Matters, where these factors were
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discussed by authors from fields of sociology, political science, anthropol-
ogy and economics (Harrison and Huntington 2000).
13 This concept was developed by Sztompka to explain diﬀerences between
developed West European and underdeveloped East European societies.
We significantly changed his formulation in an attempt to improve it to
observe the diﬀerences between East European societies.
14 To illustrate, let us take the example of the fuzzy – set ‘developmental per-
formance.’ On the basis of Porter’s definition of successful economic de-
velopment as ‘a process of successful upgrading, in which the business en-
vironment in a nation evolves to support and encourage increasingly so-
phisticated ways of competing’ (Porter, in World Economic Forum 2002,
57), we defined the concept, three anchors, and their verbal labels. We then
used various statistical data on patents (innovativeness and new knowl-
edge), gdp (ppp), overall productivity and total hourly compensation for
manufacturing workers, to classify the countries into three groups, and
then assigned membership scores for each country (1 = high developmen-
tal performance, 0.5 = medium developmental performance, 0 = low de-
velopmental performance).
15 We analysed the data with computer programme fs/qca, version 0.963.
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